Interpreting Bananaworld: A response to Bub's Quantum Mechanics for
  Primates by Mohrhoff, Ulrich
ar
X
iv
:1
21
2.
36
06
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  1
6 D
ec
 20
12
Interpreting Bananaworld: A response to
Bub’s Quantum Mechanics for Primates
Ulrich Mohrhoff
Sri Aurobindo International Centre of Education
Pondicherry 605002, India
ujm@auromail.net
Abstract
The interpretative principle proposed by Bub in 1211.3062v1 [quant-
ph] is justified only for all practical purposes (Bell’s “FAPP trap”).
An alternative interpretative principle is proposed. It brings to light
those features of the quantum world because of which the fundamental
theoretical framework of physics is a “mere” probability calculus, and it
amply justifies Bohr’s insistence that quantum-mechanical observables
cannot be defined without reference to the experimental conditions
in which they are measured. It implies that the spatial distinctions
we make cannot be intrinsic to space, that regions “of space” must be
realized by macroscopic objects, that the spatiotemporal differentiation
of the physical world is incomplete, that the positions of macroscopic
objects (suitably defined) are definite in a nonclassical sense, and that
unconditional factuality can be consistently attributed to them.
1 Introduction
In his recent paper “Bananaworld: Quantum Mechanics for Primates” [1],
Jeffrey Bub writes (and I could not agree more) that
quantum mechanics is about probabilistic correlations, i.e., about
the structure of information, insofar as a theory of information is
essentially a theory of probabilistic correlations—not about en-
ergy being quantized in discrete lumps or quanta, not about par-
ticles being wavelike, not about the universe continually splitting
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into countless co-existing quasi-classical universes, with many
copies of ourselves, or anything like that. [original emphasis]
Having said this, and taking for granted that “the dynamics. . . generally pro-
duces entanglement between two coupled systems,” Bub raises the question
whether “the dynamics. . . is consistent with the assumption that something
definite happens in a measurement process”:
The basic question is whether it is consistent with the unitary
dynamics to take the macroscopic measurement “pointer” or, in
general, the macroworld as definite.
To my mind, the fact that quantum mechanics is about probabilistic cor-
relations implies that quantum mechanics is a probability calculus. The
events to which this assigns probabilities, as well as the data on the basis
of which the probabilities are assigned, are measurement outcomes. This
being so, I cannot but wonder how quantum mechanics can at the same
time be about (let alone describe) a linear, unitary dynamics that “gen-
erally produces entanglement between coupled systems.” I can’t seem to
reconcile these notions. Rather, I think that Bub’s list of what quantum
mechanics is not about lacks a crucial item: in addition to not being about
energy being quantized in discrete lumps or quanta, about particles being
wavelike, about the universe continually splitting into countless co-existing
quasi-classical universes, it is not about a dynamical process of any sort.
Bub further writes (and again I could not agree more) that “we should
not expect to find a dynamical explanation for the selection of a particular
outcome in a quantum measurement”:
The selection of a particular outcome in a quantum measure-
ment, and the associated loss of complementary information, is
a genuinely random event, a “free choice” on the part of the
system, not the culmination of a dynamical process.
Since the quantum-mechanical probability calculus presupposes the events
to which, and on the basis of which, it serves to assign probabilities, it
should not come as a surprise that quantum mechanics cannot account for
the existence of these events [2, 3]. Quantum-mechanical probabilities are
conditional probabilities, and this for at least two reasons. One is that they
are assigned to possible measurement outcomes on the basis of actual out-
comes. This is a direct consequence of the fact that quantum mechanics is
about probabilistic correlations. If the possible outcomes of two measure-
ments are correlated, the actual outcome of either measurement can be used
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as the basis for assigning probabilities to the possible outcomes of the other
measurement. (This is as true for measurements performed on the same
system at different times as it is for measurements performed on different
systems in spacelike relation.)
Another reason why quantum-mechanical probabilities are conditional
is that they are assigned to possible measurement outcomes conditional on
the existence of an outcome. (This after all is why the probabilities of the
possible outcomes of a measurement add up to 1.) The probability P (q,Q, t)
with which a measurement of Q attempted at the time t yields the outcome
q is the product of two probabilities: the probability P (Q, t) that the mea-
surement succeeds (which, as every experimental physicist can confirm, is by
no means certain), and the probability p(q|Q, t) that the outcome of a mea-
surement of Q, attempted at the time t, is q just in case the measurement
succeeds:
P (q,Q, t) = p(q|Q, t)P (Q, t).
Quantum mechanics is exclusively concerned with conditional probabilities
of the form p(q|Q, t). Here again there are two conditions: Q and t. The
fact that Q appears as a condition tells us that quantum mechanics is in-
capable of predicting whether there will be an outcome. (This must not be
confused with the theory’s inability to predict the actual outcome whenever
probabilities greater than 0 are assigned to two or more possible outcomes.)
Because quantum mechanics “knows nothing” about causally sufficient con-
ditions for (successful) measurements, the appearance of an actual outcome
cannot be anything other than what Bub declares it to be, “a truly random
event.”
The fact that t appears as a condition, on the other hand, tells us that
the time on which a quantum-mechanical probability algorithm—a state
vector, a wave function, or a density operator—functionally depends is not
the continuous time-dependence of an evolving physical state. Rather, it is
the time of the measurement to the possible outcomes of which the algorithm
serves to assign probabilities.
What, then, could be the sense in which the “dynamics. . . generally pro-
duces entanglement between two coupled systems”? Suppose that the prob-
ability algorithm
|Ψ(t1)〉 =
(∑
i
ci |ai(t1)〉
)
⊗ |b0(t1)〉
is associated with a composite system. It tells us that a (successful) joint
measurement performed on the component systems at the time t1 will yield
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the pair of values ai, b0 with probability |ci|
2. Suppose next that the com-
ponent systems interact between the times t2 > t1 and t3 > t2, and that the
probability algorithm for (not at) a time t4 > t3 is
|Ψ(t4)〉 =
∑
i
ci |ai(t4)〉 ⊗ |bi(t4)〉.
This tells us that a (successful) joint measurement performed on the compo-
nent systems at the time t4 will yield the pair of values ai, bi with probability
|ci|
2. The “dynamics” which “produces” the entangled state |Ψ(t4)〉 does
not consist in the continuous evolution of a physical state |Ψ(t)〉 from t1 to
t4. Rather, it consists in the substitution of one probability algorithm for
another. |Ψ(t)〉 is not an instantaneous state that exists at the time t, and
this for the same reason that the probability for something to happen at the
time t is not something that exists at the time t.
But does not the change from |Ψ(t2)〉 to |Ψ(t3)〉 describe the interaction
that takes place between t2 and t3? And if so, does it not describe a continu-
ous process? Because the answer to the first question is negative, the second
question does not arise. The change from |Ψ(t2)〉 to |Ψ(t3)〉 describes the ef-
fect this interaction has on probability assignments to the possible outcomes
of whichever joint measurement is performed after t3.
Finally suppose that the probability algorithm for the time t4 is
|Ψ(t4)〉 =
∑
i
ci |ei(t4)〉 ⊗ |ai(t4)〉 ⊗ |bi(t4)〉,
where the kets |bi〉, |ai〉, and |ei〉 are states of a system, an apparatus, and
the (internal and external) apparatus environment, respectively. The en-
vironment will be so strongly correlated with the rest of the world that it
makes little sense to distinguish between the environment and the rest of
the world. In other words, the environment is the rest of the world (relative
to system and apparatus). |Ψ(t4)〉 now tells us that a joint measurement
performed on the system, the apparatus, and the rest of the world at the
time t4 will yield the respective values ei, ai, bi with probability |ci|
2. Since
quantum-mechanical probability assignments are conditional on the success-
ful performance of a measurement of a specified observable at a specified
time, and since it is logically impossible to subject the rest of the world
to a measurement, all that this “entangled state at the end of a quantum
measurement process” does is to reduce to absurdity the unitary dynamics
as Bub understands it.
Bub’s basic question—“whether it is consistent with the unitary dy-
namics to take the macroscopic measurement ‘pointer’ or, in general, the
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macroworld as definite”—thus is a no-brainer. Quantum mechanics is about
probabilistic correlations. What happens in a measurement is not a transfer
of indefiniteness from the observable measured to the pointer reading but
the reverse: a transfer of definiteness (or factuality) from the pointer reading
to the observable measured. If a unitary dynamics “takes place,” it takes
place between the correlata whose correlations it encapsulates. There is no
mystical arena, unobservable to mortals, which evolves according to a uni-
tary dynamics, and in which matters of fact about the values of observables
pop up at random. There are (i) matters of fact about the values of observ-
ables and (ii) the unitary transformations by which they are probabilistically
correlated. (It may be wholesome to bear in mind that the “dynamics” is
unitary only because the probabilities of the possible outcomes of a mea-
surement are supposed to add up to 1.)
The basic question is not how the unitary dynamics can be consistent
with a definite macroworld. The basic question is how quantum mechan-
ics can be at once a fundamental physical theory and a “mere” probability
calculus, concerned with nothing but probabilistic correlations. As a proba-
bility calculus, it presupposes the value-indicating facts to which (and on the
basis of which) probabilities are assigned. It presupposes an actual world
containing events that are governed by irreducibly probabilistic correlation
laws. As a fundamental physical theory, it must make it possible to identify
a set of observables whose values are factual per se (as opposed to factual
only because they are indicated by pointers whose positions are factual per
se).
The emphasis is on factuality—for which Bub uses Einstein’s expression
So-Sein (“being thus”)—rather than on definiteness. The two concepts are
by no means equivalent. Definiteness is sufficient for factuality. Because
the classical world is definite, we may think of it as factual per se.1 The
converse is not true. Factuality is not sufficient for definiteness, unless it
be a nonclassical definiteness (see Sec. 4). The good news here is that the
basic question can be answered without demonstrating the consistency of
attributing definiteness to the macroworld. Demonstrating the consistency
of attributing factuality to the macroworld will suffice.
1The state of a classical system with n degrees of freedom can be represented by a point
P in a 2n-dimensional phase space S , and the positive outcome of an elementary test can
be represented by a subset U ⊂ S . The probability of obtaining U is equal to unity if
P ∈ U and equal to zero if P /∈ U . Because the probability algorithm P only assigns the
trivial probabilities 0 and 1, it may be thought of as a state in the classical sense of the
word: a collection of possessed properties. We are at liberty to believe that the probability
of finding the property represented by U is equal to unity because the system has it.
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The identification of an observable R whose value is (or can be consis-
tently stipulated to be) either definite or factual per se calls for an inter-
pretative principle. Bub proposes to treat the decoherence pointer selected
by environmental decoherence as such an observable. In Sec. 2 I explain
why Bub’s interpretative principle justifies the attribution of definiteness
to the pointers selected by environmental decoherence only for all practical
purposes. In Sec. 3 I propose an interpretative principle that (i) implies the
strict consistency of attributing factuality to the macroworld, (ii) brings to
light those features of the quantum world because of which the fundamen-
tal theoretical framework of physics is a “mere” probability calculus, and
(iii) amply justifies Bohr’s insistence that quantum-mechanical observables
cannot be defined without reference to the experimental conditions in which
they are measured. The final task—to define the macroworld in terms of
the quantum-mechanical probability calculus and to demonstrate the strict
consistency of attributing to it an unconditional factuality—is carried out
in Sec. 4.
2 Bub’s interpretative principle
Here is how Bub states (and justifies) his interpretative principle:
If we take R as the decoherence “pointer” selected by environ-
mental decoherence, then it follows that the macroworld is al-
ways definite because of the nature of the decoherence interac-
tion coupling environmental degrees of freedom to macroworld
degrees of freedom.
In an earlier paper [4] Bub argued that
the inconsistency in reconciling the entangled state at the end
of a quantum measurement process with the definiteness of the
macroscopic pointer reading and the definiteness of the corre-
lated value of the measured micro-observable is only apparent
and depends on a stipulation that is not required by the struc-
ture of the quantum possibility space. Replacing this stipulation
by an alternative consistent stipulation resolves the problem.
The stipulation that is not required by the quantum-mechanical proba-
bility calculus is an interpretative principle sometimes referred to as the
“eigenvalue-eigenstate link,” which Dirac [5, pp. 46–47] formulated as fol-
lows:
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The expression that an observable “has a particular value” for
a particular state is permissible in quantum mechanics in the
special case when a measurement of the observable is certain to
lead to the particular value, so that the state is an eigenstate of
the observable.
(The reason why I likewise reject the eigenvalue-eigenstate link is not that
it makes it impossible to reconcile the entangled state “at the end of a
quantum measurement process” with the definiteness of the macroscopic
pointer reading but that |Ψ(t)〉 is not an instantaneous state existing at
the time t, anymore than the probability that something happens at the
time t exists at the time t.) The alternative stipulation, which Bub claims
resolves the problem, is to attribute definiteness to the pointer selected by
environmental decoherence.
Detailed investigations of a large number of specific models have demon-
strated that the reduced density operators associated with sufficiently large
and/or massive systems, obtained by partial tracing over “realistic” envi-
ronments, become very nearly diagonal with respect to a privileged pointer
basis in a very short time, and that they stay that way for a very long
time [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. “Very nearly diagonal,” however, is not the same as
“diagonal.” It is equivalent to “diagonal FAPP” [11].
If the off-diagonal (or interference) terms would vanish completely and
for all time, the selection (by us) of a single diagonal element would be as
unproblematic as the selection (by us) of the actual world in the context of
classical physics. (Physical theories deal with nomologically possible worlds.
No physical theory, whether classical or quantum, can distinguish the actual
world from the other nomologically possible worlds.2 One salient difference
between classical physics and quantum physics is that the former does not
cause anybody to worry about how possibilities become facts.) Because the
off-diagonal terms are not strictly 0, Bell’s criticism (“FAPP-trap!”) also
applies to Bub’s resolution of the problem. Because the interference terms
are extremely small, it is impossible for all practical purposes to observe the
coherence in superpositions of pointer states, and this justifies the attribu-
tion of definiteness to the pointers selected by environmental decoherence
for all practical purposes.
2This is another reason why quantum theory ought not to be called upon to distinguish
the actual outcome of a measurement from the other possible outcomes.
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3 Yet another interpretative principle
More can be accomplished. I will now formulate an interpretative principle
that
1. implies the strict consistency (rather than the consistency FAPP) of
attributing factuality (rather than definiteness) to the macroworld,
2. brings to light those features of the quantum world because of which
the fundamental theoretical framework of physics is a “mere” proba-
bility calculus,
3. and amply justifies Bohr’s insistence that quantum-mechanical observ-
ables cannot be defined without reference to the experimental arrange-
ments by which they are measured.3
If a quantum state’s dependence on time were the continuous time depen-
dence of an evolving physical state, quantum states would be instantaneous
states evolving according to a unitary dynamics, except (possibly) at the
time of a measurement, when they are said to collapse or appear to do so.
Having disposed of the measurement problem in its crudest form—Why two
modes of evolution for the price of one?—we are left with two Lorentz invari-
ant computational rules, one requiring us to first square the absolute values
of amplitudes and then add the result, the other requiring us to first add am-
plitudes and then square the absolute value of the result. Why two? What is
the essential difference between their respective conditions of applicability?
Here is the interpretative principle I propose:
Whenever quantum mechanics instructs us to first add the amplitudes
associated with alternatives and then square the absolute value of the
result, the distinctions we make between the alternatives correspond to
nothing in the real world. They exist solely in our minds.
All it now takes to unearth the single most important feature of the
quantum world, is the two-slit experiment with electrons. (When Feynman
3See for instance Ref. [12], wherein Bohr states that “the limited commutability of the
symbols by which [kinematical and dynamical] variables are represented in the quantal
formalism corresponds to the mutual exclusion of the experimental arrangements required
for their unambiguous definition.” D’Espagnat [13] formulates one of “the two pillars
on which Bohr’s doctrine is built” in the following way: “In general, quantum systems
should not even be thought of as possessing individual properties [such as position and
momentum] independently of the experimental arrangements.”
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said that this experiment “has in it the heart of quantum mechanics” [14], he
may have been more right than he knew.) If quantum mechanics instructs
us to add amplitudes, it is not the case that the individual electron goes
through either the left slit or the right slit. Somehow an electron can go
through both slits (as a whole, without being divided into parts4 that go
through different slits).
But how is it possible for a particle to go through both slits? This would
indeed be impossible if the two slits were different parts of space, which is
what we are inclined to think. Let us then ask: how exactly do the two slits
in a double-slit experiment differ? They are cutouts in a slit plate—things
that have been removed, things that are no longer there. What difference
do they leave behind after they have been removed? The difference between
the positions they previously occupied? But positions are properties (or
relational properties, if you prefer, or properties of pairs), and properties
exist only if and while they are possessed. Or do they?
There is something peculiar about the way we tend to think about space.
We all more or less readily agree that red, round, or a smile cannot exist
without a red or round object or a smiling face. This is why the Cheshire
cat strikes us as funny. Why then do we tend to believe that positions exist
by themselves, without being possessed?
It has not always been so. Influential thinkers from Aristotle to Kant
and Gauss have insisted that potential infinities, such as the possibility of
conceptually dividing space ad infinitum, should be thought of as just that—
possibilities rather than actualities. Kant [16] wrote that the so-called parts
of space
cannot precede the one all-embracing space, as being, as it were,
constituents out of which it can be composed; on the contrary,
they can be thought only as in it.
What Kant says about the parts of space applies, a fortiori, to the so-called
points of space. In the second half of the nineteenth century mathematics
nevertheless shifted to dealing with the continuum as a set of points. “So
successful has this shift been,” von Weizsa¨cker [17, p. 347] remarked, “that it
is nearly impossible to disabuse the contemporary student of mathematics
4The question of parts does not arise. Analogous experiments have been performed with
C60 molecules using a grating with 50-nm-wide slits and a 100-nm period [15]. We do not
picture the individual carbon nuclei as getting separated by many times 100 nanometers
and then reassemble into a ball less than a nanometer across. Nor is a probability algorithm
like the wave function something possessing parts that pass through different slits.
9
of the superstition that this conception is the only possible, indeed ‘the’
theory of . . . ‘the’ continuum.”
If one calls a self-adjoint operator “elephant” and a spectral decompo-
sition “trunk,” one can prove that every elephant has a trunk. Likewise, if
one calls a real number “point” and the transfinite manifold of real num-
bers “continuum,” one can think of the continuum as composed of points.
But does this mathematical continuum have more in common with phys-
ical space than the spectral theorem has with certain pachyderms? Von
Weizsa¨cker [17, p. 130] did not think so:
The conception of the continuum as potential, which originated
with Aristotle, appears to be more suitable for the quantum
theoretical way of thinking than is the set-theoretical conception
of an actually existing transfinite manifold of “real numbers,”
or of the spatial points they designate. The “real number” is a
free creation of the human mind and perhaps not conformable
to reality.
If proof is needed that the set-theoretic conception of space is not con-
formable to reality, it is the ability of a particle to go through more slits
than one (as a whole, without being divided into parts that go through
different slits).
The reason why it is possible for a particle to go through both slits is
that the distinction we make between the spatial alternatives defined by the
slits has no reality as far as the electron is concerned.
But if there is a single physical system for which this distinction has no
reality, then it cannot be intrinsic to space. What, then, furnishes space
with its so-called parts? The answer: macroscopic detectors.5 By realizing
(making real) a specific region “of space,” a detector makes it possible to
attribute to another object the property of being in that region. And this
bears generalization: the measurement apparatus is needed not only to in-
dicate the answer to a question but also, and in the first place, to define a
question by making its possible answers available for attribution. This is the
reason why the events to which quantum mechanics assigns probabilities are
outcomes of measurements.
But if it is impossible to attribute to a physical object the property of
being in a region “of space” unless this is realized by a detector, then the
5Such detectors are found not only in physics laboratories. Any macroscopic object
equipped with a sensitive region R and capable of indicating the presence in R of another
physical object qualifies.
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spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world cannot be complete—it
cannot go “all the way down.” Because the uncertainty principle prevents
physical objects from having definite positions (relative to each other), it
is impossible for a detector to realize a definite position. This allows us to
conceive of a partition of space into finite regions so small that none of them
is realized. But if none of them is realized, the spatial differentiation of the
physical world is incomplete—it does not go “all the way down.”
The same applies to the world’s temporal differentiation, and this not
merely because of the relativistic interdependence of distances and dura-
tions. Just as the properties of quantum systems or the values of quantum
observables need to be realized by macroscopic devices, so the times at
which properties or values are possessed need to be realized by macroscopic
clocks. And just as it is physically impossible for macroscopic devices to
realize sharp positions, so it is physically impossible for macroscopic clocks
to realize sharp times [18].
But if neither the spatial nor the temporal differentiation of the physical
world goes “all the way down,” determinism is out, and so is that mystical
arena in which quantum states evolve and outcome-indicating facts pop up
at random.6 And if the dynamics (literally construed) is out, there can be
no kind of evolving instantaneous physical state (inasmuch as such a state,
existing as it does at every instant of time, cannot exist in the absence of a
completely differentiated time), and all that can be predicted is probabilities.
This is the reason why the fundamental theoretical framework of physics is
a probability calculus.
4 The macroworld
One task remains: to define the macroworld in terms of the quantum-
mechanical probability calculus and to demonstrate the strict consistency
(rather than the consistency FAPP) of attributing to it an unconditional
factuality.
The possibility of obtaining factual evidence of the departure of an object
O from its classically predictable position calls for detectors whose position
probability distributions are narrower than O’s. (By the classically pre-
dictable position of O I mean the position that can be predicted on the
basis of all relevant position-indicating events and the relevant classical law
6Bohr was right, there is no quantum world in this particular sense, Bub’s politically
correct jibe at “Copenhagen or neo-Copenhagen instrumentalism” notwithstanding. (One
may disagree with Bohr about what there is instead.)
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of motion.) For most objects that are commonly called “macroscopic” such
detectors do not exist. For all so-called macroscopic objects this means that
the probability of obtaining factual evidence of departures from their clas-
sically predictable motion is low.7 Hence there are many so-called macro-
scopic objects of which the following is true: every one of their measured
positions is consistent with every prediction that can be made on the basis
of previous measurement outcomes and a classical law of motion. These are
the objects that truly deserve to be labeled “macroscopic.” To permit a
macroscopic pointer to indicate the value of an observable, one exception
has to be made: its position can change unpredictably if and when it serves
to indicate a value.
The macroworld can now be defined unambiguously as the totality of
relative positions that exist between macroscopic objects—the totality of
macroscopic positions, for short. Macroscopic positions constitute the set of
observables whose values can consistently be though of as factual per se.
The crucial role played by the incompleteness of the world’s spatiotem-
poral differentiation in demonstrating the consistency of attributing uncon-
ditional factuality to the macroworld deserves to be stressed. By definition,
macroscopic positions never evince their indefiniteness (in the only way they
could, through departures from classically predictable values). Macroscopic
objects therefore follow trajectories that are only counterfactually “fuzzy”:
their positions are “smeared out” only in relation to an imaginary spatiotem-
poral background that is more differentiated than is the actual physical
world. In the actual physical world there is no spatiotemporal background
other than that defined by the positions of macroscopic objects and the times
indicated by macroscopic clocks. Relative to this background, the positions
of macroscopic objects and the times indicated by macroscopic clocks are
definite as a matter of course. Hence we may, if we wish, attribute to the
macroworld not only the unconditional factuality of the world of classical
physics but also a genuine, albeit nonclassical, definiteness: macroscopic po-
sition are definite relative to the spatiotemporal background that actually
exists in the physical world—they are as definite as it gets in the physical
world.
7This is where decoherence investigations [6, 7, 8, 10] come in. They demonstrate
quantitatively that, where macroscopic objects are concerned, the probability of obtaining
factual evidence of departures from “classicality” is extremely low.
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5 Discussion
The basic question is not how the “unitary dynamics” can be consistent with
a definite macroworld. The basic question is: how can quantum mechanics
be at once a fundamental physical theory and a “mere” probability calculus?
As a probability calculus, it presupposes the value-indicating facts to which
(and on the basis of which) it serves to assign probabilities. As a fundamental
physical theory, it must make it possible to identify a set of observables
whose values can consistently be though of as factual per se, and this not
just FAPP.
The relative positions that exist between macroscopic objects constitute
such a set. What makes it possible to demonstrate the strict consistency of
attributing unconditional factuality to their values is that the spatiotempo-
ral differentiation of the physical world is incomplete; it does not go “all the
way down.” And what makes it possible to demonstrate this incompleteness
is the interpretative principle proposed in Sec. 3.
Whenever quantum mechanics instructs us to first square the absolute
values of amplitudes associated with alternatives and then add the result,
there either is a matter of fact about the alternative taken, in which case we
are dealing with ignorance probabilities, or the possibility of determining the
alternative taken exists.8 On the other hand, whenever quantum mechanics
requires us to first add the amplitudes and then square the absolute value of
the result, there cannot be any matter of fact about the alternative taken,
and in this case we are not dealing with subjective or epistemic probabilities.
We are dealing with probabilities that are objective (as opposed to subjective
or epistemic). And the reason why they are objective (in this sense) is that
the distinctions we make between the alternatives correspond to nothing in
the real world. They exist solely in our minds.
In a way, Bub is right. The identification of an observable whose value
can be consistently regarded as definite calls for a judicious choice on our
part. I agree with Bub that the best (and arguably the only possible) choice
is to stipulate the definiteness of the macroworld and of the instrument
pointers it contains. However, this definiteness cannot be the definiteness
of a classical position, which is sharp (dispersion-free) relative to an in-
trinsically and completely differentiated spatiotemporal background. It can
only be the nonclassical definiteness of a macroscopic position, which is
only counterfactually “fuzzy” (that is, “smeared out” only in relation to an
8This possibility exists if the alternatives are correlated with those of a second system,
in which case the alternative taken can be determined by a measurement on the second
system.
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imaginary spatiotemporal background that is more differentiated than is the
actual physical world). What stands in the way of reconciling the entangled
state “at the end of a quantum measurement process” with the definiteness
of the macroscopic pointer reading is not the eigenvalue-eigenstate link, as
Bub maintains, but a holdover from classical times—the belief that the spa-
tiotemporal differentiation of the physical world goes “all the way down.”
Moreover, the incompleteness of the world’s spatiotemporal differenti-
ation, which makes it possible to consistently attribute unconditional fac-
tuality to macroscopic positions, can be demonstrated without recourse to
decoherence, and so can the consistency of attributing unconditional factual-
ity to macroscopic positions. Decoherence investigations merely confirm the
conclusion that for sufficiently large and/or massive systems the probability
of obtaining factual evidence of departures from “classicality” is extremely
low, which ensures the existence of objects that are macroscopic according
to the definition given in Sec. 4.
Finally, whereas Bub provides no reason for his choice of interpretative
principle other than that it stipulates the obvious (the consistency of the
quantum-mechanical probability calculus with the existence of the events to
which it serves to assign probabilities), the interpretative principle proposed
in Sec. 3 explains why quantum mechanics can be at once a fundamental
physical theory and a “mere” probability calculus. In summary: it im-
plies that the spatial distinctions we make cannot be intrinsic to space, that
regions “of space” must be realized by macroscopic objects, that the spa-
tiotemporal differentiation of the physical world is incomplete, that macro-
scopic positions are definite in a nonclassical sense, and that unconditional
factuality can be consistently attributed to them.
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